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Abstract 
KPMG (Direct Research Internship Programme) recommended the topic of the current empirical research, 
the objective of which is to uncover whether the market understands what auditing is, and if it recognizes the 
potential benefits of an (unqualified) audit report (e.g. to obtain more favourable loan conditions and to 
strengthen internal controls). The research also aims to uncover whether the market distinguishes on quality 
between the Big Four or a smaller firm. 
The results of the semi-structured interviews (with eight company executives and six elite bankers) reveal 
that some businesses carry out an audit solely to comply, with larger firms more likely to engage voluntarily. 
Consistent with the literature, banks advocate the superior quality of the Big Four, although many SMEs use 
smaller firms. As for lending, not all enterprises believe banks offer more favourable conditions, yet banks 
argue auditors’ unqualified opinion induce lower interest rates. 
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In 2015, the collective global audit revenues of the Big Four Accounting Firms (PwC, Deloitte, E&Y, and 
KPMG) surpassed $45 billion (Butcher, 2016), which, comparatively speaking is greater than the GDP of 
either Tunisia or Slovenia in the last year (World Bank, 2017). From this figure, it is evident that auditing 
consumes a considerable amount of (financial) resources. But, what is an audit? Indeed, why are audits so 
relevant that they are required by law? Do stakeholders understand the value of external auditing? The aim of 
this empirical research is to examine the perceptions of some market participants regarding external auditing. 
In answer to the first question: an audit is defined as the accumulation and assessment of evidence about 
information to conclude and report on the degree of similarity between the information and applicable criteria 
(Elder et al., 2010). Therefore, as suggested by the International Standard on Auditing 200, the purpose of an 
external audit is to enhance the degree of confidence of intended users in the financial statements of the 
company, through the emission of the auditor’s opinion on whether they are prepared, in all material respects, 
in accordance with the applicable financial reporting framework. Thus, if the company follows the applicable 
framework, the auditors issue an “unqualified opinion” (vs a “qualified opinion”). 
As proposed by the second question presented above, auditing can be seen as essential such that often it 
is a legal requirement. Portuguese law requires virtually all medium and large corporations and all state-
owned and public-interest entities to have their financial statements audited. Relevance is justified, therefore, 
by the inherent demand for an audit and the numerous benefits one brings.  
The origin of modern auditing coincides with the Industrial Revolution in Great Britain at the end of the 
eighteenth century. This led to the development of large industrial corporations that required external capital 
to support further expansion, which implied an evident separation between capital providers and managers. 
This resulted in the need for company managers to report to the providers of funds on the financial outcomes 
attained; and this led to the need to ensure that those reports were reliable through an independent review 
(Hayes et al., 2014). 
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This highlights why external audits are necessary when companies grow in size (Abdel-Khalik, 1993). 
Firstly, as the number of transactions increases so does the likelihood of error and, as a result, auditors are 
required to detect these. Secondly, as the number of stakeholders increases, the more inefficient it becomes 
for each to review the financial statements individually and thus there is a need for a representative auditor 
(Porter et al., 2014). Thirdly, with the increasing number of players, conflicts of interest arise; therefore, as 
stated by Cohen et al. (2002), the audit is used as a monitoring tool, constituting an important part of the 
corporate governance panel, in the sense that it ensures sound financial reporting. Actually, external auditing 
constitutes one of three lines of defence that organizations own in order to manage risk, these are: the board 
or the operational management; the risk, compliance, and control areas; and the independent assurance 
providers, such as internal and external auditors (IIA, 2013; Arndorfer and Minto, 2015). Lastly, many 
companies issue debt to finance further growth and, as Chow (1982) suggests, accounting figures are essential 
for covenant determination; Chow’s empirical analysis supports the hypothesis that the higher the level of 
leverage the more important these covenants are, so the need for transparent reporting increases. As to the 
benefits of auditing, the process is valuable for stakeholders as a whole, since auditing provides credibility to 
the financial information provided by the auditee. As auditors often present a list of additional observations 
comprising issues that can be improved, the reporting entity might also gain advantage from the auditor’s 
work (Porter et al., 2014). The audit process is also beneficial to society as a whole, since transparent financial 
data enhances efficiency in capital allocation by helping investors and managers find value-creation 
opportunities. In the end, as Ball (2001) suggests, a strong reporting and disclosure system is a requirement 
for the existence of dynamic financial markets. Additionally, researchers such as Strawser (1994), find that 
companies with audited financial information are more likely to receive favourable loan decisions, in the form 
of lower interest rates and greater borrowing potential. The reasoning behind this is that, all things being 
equal, companies with audited accounts, particularly with unqualified opinions, vis-à-vis companies that do 
not, should have a lower credit risk, better internal rating, and, as a consequence, lower pricing. 
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Lastly, this empirical study explores the differences in the audit service provided by the Big Four vs the 
non-Big Four. Typically, the Big Four firms are viewed as providing better quality auditing services (Francis 
and Krishnan, 1999). The perception is that they deliver greater competence, owing to their huge investment 
in people. Additionally, as DeAngelo (1981) proposes, the Big Four tend to provide superior quality services 
because they have “more to lose” both in reputational matters and in terms of litigation costs.  
There is a vast amount of literature and technical review on the definition of external auditing, its purpose, 
benefits, impact on bank loans, and finally, the difference between audit services provided by one of the Big 
Four vs a non-Big Four. Nevertheless, there is less research into how different market participants (e.g. 
shareholders, auditees, creditors, government agents, and suppliers) see external auditing. Furthermore, with 
recent scandals affecting this sector caused by the financial crisis, a study to gauge perceptions and the image 
of external auditing seems even more pertinent. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to collect explicit 
perceptions from companies and banks regarding external auditing. The method to support this research 
comprises interviews containing questions relative to the meaning, importance, and purpose of external 
auditing; its implications on bank loans, as well as the difference in quality, offered by the Big Four firms vs 
other auditing firms. The remainder of the research is organized as follows. Section 2 covers the main goals 
of the internship. Section 3 presents the literature review, which includes both previous theoretical and 
empirical analysis and, on the top of that, incorporates practical impressions derived from the internship. 
Section 4 consists of the methodology and the data. Section 5, by its turn, collates the results and elaborates 
on them. Section 6 concludes the analysis. Section 7 presents the implications of the results on the business 
world. And Section 8 closes the report with suggestions for future research. 
2 Objectives of the Internship 
NOVA School of Business and Economics implemented the DRI-type Working Project (hereafter WP) in 
order to allow students to gain professional experience while developing a dissertation. The idea is that the 
student takes advantage of contact with the business community and incorporates these insights into the 
research, enriching the analysis with a “real-world approach”. Actually, the topic of this thesis was born out 
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of a gap perceived in the business world while in the field, which relates to the poor understanding of the 
auditing profession. This has, in fact, already been found, for example by Strawser (1994), who mentions that 
users do not understand the nature of auditing and assurances provided by auditing engagements, and by Gray 
and Ratzinger (2010) who state that most members of the National Association of Investment Clubs could 
not name all the Big Four firms. 
My personal internship at KPMG’s Audit and Assurance department, aims to achieve two main objectives 
regarding this WP: the first goal is to clearly understand what external auditing is, and how it is performed; 
and the second objective is to capture the perceptions of the stakeholders in relation to external auditing. 
Hence, the analysis is limited by the number of interviewees and by the number of different interactions 
established during the internship. 
3 Theory and Literature Review 
Section 3 comprises extensive debate on matters of external auditing. The idea is to give support to the 
interview questions. It initiates with the origin of external auditing together with its definition. Following this, 
some reasoning is provided for why there is a legal obligation to have financial statements audited, and both 
the demand for auditing and the benefits of performing external auditing are considered. A debate is then 
presented as to whether the auditing of financial statements has any impact when borrowing credit from banks. 
Finally, a discussion about the differences in quality of an audit conducted by a Big Four firm vs other auditing 
companies is exhibited. 
Origin and Definition  
Ramamoorti (2003) points to evidence of audits dating to public systems in Babylonia, Greece, the Roman 
Empire, and the City States of Italy, all of which developed a detailed system of checks and counterchecks. 
Avoidance of accounting error as well as fraud by dishonest officials was the intention, this author suggests; 
showing how the emergence of external auditing is rooted in the necessity to have forms of independent 
verification to reduce bookkeeping errors, asset misappropriation, and fraud. 
9 
 
Modern auditing, however, can be traced back to the beginning of the Industrial Revolution in Britain, 
which originated the first big industrial organizations seeking external funds to manage growth. For the first 
time, there was a clear separation between capital providers and managers. Consequently, as proposed by the 
so-called Theory of Inspired Confidence, developed at the beginning of the twentieth century by the Dutch 
Professor Theodore Limperg, the demand for auditing increased as a result of the involvement of outside 
stakeholders. These stakeholders demanded accountability from management in return for their contribution 
to the company. As financial results presented by management might be biased, due to the likely presence of 
a conflict of interest, external auditing was necessary (Hayes et al., 2014). The practice of auditing has evolved 
in response to changes in the business environment. Today auditing can be defined, according to the 
Committee on Basic Auditing Concepts, as a systematic process of objectively gathering and evaluating 
evidence relating to assertions about economic actions and events in which the individual making the 
assertions has been engaged, to ascertain the degree of correspondence between those assertions and 
established criteria, and communicating the results to users of the reports in which the assertions are made. 
Demand for External Auditing 
As mentioned above, the growing separation between the interests of capital providers and the functions of 
management has increased demand for managers to report the firm’s financial results to funders. Hence, hiring 
professional managers distinct from the owners of the firm both increases the need to communicate financial 
information while also presenting the need to have this communication audited, due to a set of factors which 
are as follows: 
First there may be a conflict of interest between managers who, basically, report on their own performance, 
and the recipients of the financial information they supply. An audit provides reassurance that the executives 
have provided information that accurately reflects the company’s financial affairs. The separation of roles has 
long been subject of research. Tauringana and Clarke (2000), for instance, point out that the lower the 
manager’s share ownership in the firm, the greater the likelihood of the firm hiring external auditing. 
Similarly, Carey et al. (2000) find empirical support for the hypotheses that, in family-run businesses, the 
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larger the share of non-family management or non-family board members, the greater the demand for auditing. 
The second factor concerns the consequences that may arise due to accounting errors. If recipients of a 
company’s financial statements base their decisions on untrustworthy figures, they could suffer severe 
financial losses. Therefore, before making decisions, requesting audited financial statements is prudent. This 
explains why researchers have found that a greater level of debt in the company can increase the likelihood 
that the company will hire the services of an auditor. As Tauringana and Clarke (2000) suggest, highly geared 
companies may be incentivized to carry out an audit, since lenders, i.e. banks, may request this, in order to 
avoid incurring financial losses. According to the same hypothesis, Chow (1982) argues that since accounting 
figures are highly relevant for determining covenants, hence the higher the level of leverage the more 
important these covenants are, and the more the need for transparent reporting. Naturally, the more reliant the 
covenants are on accounts information, the higher the probability of hiring external auditing, as Smith and 
Warner (1979) have pointed out. The third reason why examination of a company’s financial information is 
crucial relates to the remoteness of information. In a modern, global economy, public companies have many 
shareholders and it is neither convenient nor efficient for such a large number of stockholders to validate the 
financial information themselves (likewise for the other stakeholders). Thus, for practical, physical, and 
economic factors, which prevent stakeholders from personally auditing the financial statements provided by 
the company, an independent party is necessary to review the information for them (Porter et al., 2014). 
Fourth, alongside company growth, the number of transactions also increases; and moreover, both economic 
transactions and accounting systems and rules become more complex. Thus, as the likelihood of making 
accounting errors increases, in order to avoid this, financial statements require examination by an independent 
qualified auditor. Yet, while the size-of-business argument has been intensively investigated it has delivered 
mixed results. Chow (1982), for example, finds moderate support for the predicted positive effect relating to 
firm size and external auditing. The empirical results of Abdel-Khalik (1993) support the hypothesis that 
voluntary demand for audit increases with the level of hierarchy (a metric relating to firm size). Depending 
on the metric of size (turnover and assets), Tauringana and Clarke (2000) find more or less favourable results 
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for the expected increase in auditing for bigger firms. Finally, Carey et al. (2000) do not find support for the 
size of business argument. 
Benefits 
The principle of external auditing – Providing Value – summarizes the benefits of auditing, as it is referred to 
in the Financial Reporting Council’s publication (2013):  
“Auditors add to the reliability and quality of financial reporting; they provide to directors and officers 
constructive observations arising from the audit process; and thereby contribute to the effective operation of 
business, capital markets and the public sector.”  
External auditing brings benefits to four main parties. First, it brings benefit to the actual users of the 
financial statements, the added value is associated with the credibility that auditing lends to the financial 
statements prepared by the auditee (Porter et al., 2014). Should the auditor detect material errors, which are 
referred to the management of the company but are not corrected, the auditor will draw attention to the errors 
by modifying opinion. In this way, users will know whether the financial statements are reliable and, if not, 
where the issues lay. In particular, and as suggested by Bushman and Smith (2003), shareholders benefit from 
having verifiable accounting information that facilitates their monitoring of management decisions, while also 
enabling directors to increase the value of the firm by reviewing and guiding the procedures of management.  
Auditees are the second party to benefit, since, as the Financial Reporting Council suggests, auditors 
frequently issue a list of additional observations comprising points to be improved, specifically regards 
internal controls. Auditors gain detailed insight into the reporting company, its business and its accounting 
system, without being involved in the entity’s daily operations. From my own experience as an auditor at 
KPMG, I am able to confirm that, in fact, auditors frequently provide a set of practical observations and 
suggestions for improvements arising from the auditing process to help companies strengthen their internal 
controls. 
The third party to benefit, although not obvious, is the management team of the audited company. 
According to Agency Theory, managers want the directors/shareholders to look favourably upon them, since 
managers are dependent on them for the success of the business and their jobs. In order to achieve this, 
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managers should produce reliable information; ergo managers are also incentivized to engage reputable 
auditors (Porter et al., 2014). It should be pointed out that in reality often managers and, in general, auditees’ 
employees, however, do not perceive the importance of this activity. 
Finally, the fourth party to benefit is society as a whole. Financial statement audits help to ensure the 
smooth functioning of financial markets as Turner (2001) suggested when he was Chief Accountant at the 
Securities and Exchange Commission in the USA: 
“Capital is providing fuel for our economic engine, funding for the growth of new businesses, and providing 
job opportunities […] Public trust begins, and ends, with the integrity of the numbers the public uses to form 
the basis for making their investment decisions […] Accordingly, investors […] have depended for over a 
hundred years on an independent third party, an external auditor, to examine the books and financial reports 
prepared by management.”  
In other words, investment is crucial to the well-being of the economy; sustained investment relies on 
investors having confidence on the information provided by the reporting entity and, consequently, about the 
external auditing function. According to Bushman and Smith (2003), accessible and reliable financial 
accounting information enables executives and investors to identify and assess investment opportunities. Even 
in the absence of a conflict of interest, quality financial data enhances efficiency by aiding investors and 
managers to find value-creation opportunities. As Black (2000) and Ball (2001) suggest, a transparent 
reporting and disclosure system is a precondition of the existence of dynamic capital markets. 
Implications for the Conditions of Lending  
The intention of this section is to provide an overview to gauge whether audited accounts impact the decisions 
of commercial lenders, mainly in terms of internal credit rating and interest rates, and to understand if audited 
financial statements provide the auditee an additional benefit. 
The internal credit rating of a client should imply (with other factors) a certain interest rate. Lenders apply 
credit ratings to assess the overall level of default risk of the firm. Hence, the more the risk the bank is bearing, 
the higher the return should be, i.e. the higher the interest rate charged and vice-versa. As Reeb et al. (2001) 
found, credit ratings play a major role in defining the cost of debt. 
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This has been a salient issue for some years now, particularly with the so-called Basel II and more recently 
Basel III Capital Accord, which requires financial institutions to use standardized measures of credit risk, 
market risk, and operational risk. Pillar 1 of this Accord sets minimum capital requirements for financial 
institutions to handle their risks (credit, market, and operational). Particularly for credit risk, banks may 
choose between two approaches to compute their required level of capital. The Standardized Methodology—
as the name implies—evaluates credit risk based on a standardized method. Alternatively, financial 
institutions, with the approval of the banking regulator, may apply the Internal Ratings-Based (IRB) approach, 
i.e., institutions may use their internal rating systems for credit risk. These banks may use their own internal 
estimates of risk components, such as the probability of default and the loss given default to determine the 
capital requirement for a given exposure, which, ideally, implies more efficient capital allocation (Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, 2006). 
In conclusion, besides other figures, regulators require banks to use external and, under the IRB approach, 
also internal ratings to define the overall risk-appetite and pricing of a certain borrower. Thus, this section 
seeks to understand whether auditors’ opinions are a valuable input when assigning a credit rating to a firm, 
and ultimately, if this impacts lending conditions. This topic of internal ratings becomes even more relevant 
in the case of Portugal, where the majority of corporations do not have external rating. 
The main argument is that, if external auditing lessens the monitoring costs of banks, as suggested by 
Watts and Zimmerman (1986), competition will steer lenders towards transferring these cost-reductions to 
borrowers through lower pricing schemes. In general, studies have found that companies with audited 
accounts are more likely to receive bank loans, since lenders associate greater reliability with audited 
statements (Balsam et al., 2003). With regard to the conditions of lending, Bamber and Stratton (1997) 
proposed that bankers associate uncertainty-modified audit reports with a greater likelihood of loan rejection, 
higher risk assessments, and higher interest rates. Strawser (1994), in turn, proposes that companies with 
financial audits are more likely to receive a more favourable loan decision. Moreover, Blackwell et al. (1998) 
assert that companies with audited accounts pay significantly lower interest rates than non-audited firms and 
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that the coefficient estimate suggests that an audited firm has, on average, reductions of 25 base points in their 
interest rates compared to an unaudited firm, ceteris paribus. According to Johnson et al. (1983), however, 
there is no relevant relation between loan interest rates and audited financial statements. 
In conclusion, risk-return trade-off theory applied to banks suggests that lower credit rating should be 
associated with riskier loans; which, in turn, implies higher interest rates as compensation. Therefore if audited 
financial statements reduce client risk through their monitoring capacity, this ought to imply a lower interest 
rate and, as a matter of fact, most empirical analyses present consistent results in this regard.  
By carrying out a series of interviews with companies, this dissertation seeks to understand what firms’ 
perceptions are concerning interest-rate reductions associated with audited accounts. The interviews also seek 
to understand whether banks (both with and without the IRB approach), in fact, take auditing into account 
when attributing a certain credit rating to a client. 
The Big Four vs Other Accounting Firms 
Although public firms in Portugal are legally required to have audited financial statements, they need not hire 
one of the Big Four for the service; nonetheless, in 2014, the Big Four accounting firms audited more than 80 
per cent of all listed companies in Portugal (Brochado, 2016). Hence, another question imposes itself on this 
study: are there differences in service quality between a Big Four accounting firm and a non-Big Four firm?  
Francis and Krishnan (1999) find that the Big Four accounting firms are more conservative when issuing 
audit opinions. Further, there is evidence to suggest that investors have more confidence in the financial results 
of a firm whose external auditor is one of the Big Four, consistent with investors perceiving this information 
as being of higher quality (Teoh and Wong, 1993). It has also been shown that clients of the Big Four firms 
exhibit higher earnings quality through lower magnitude of discretionary accruals (Becker et al., 1998). To 
the extent that discretionary accruals capture opportunistic earnings management, this implies that the Big 
Four firms tolerate less earnings management than other auditors. Lawrence et al. (2011), in turn, controlled 
for the endogenous choice (i.e. auditing firms select the less risky clients with higher earnings quality 
beforehand) and the results indicate that companies audited by one of the Big Four present an audit quality 
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similar to that of non-Big Four clients. In a related study, Boone et al. (2010) find that Big Four and mid-tier 
accounting firms show similar audit quality, whereby audit quality is measured by the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals. A more recent study conducted by Eshleman and Guo (2014), however, suggests that 
companies audited by one of the Big Four are less likely to subsequently restate their earnings than clients of 
the non-Big Four, which is consistent with the Big Four firms offering superior quality audits. These authors 
argue that selecting the audit-quality proxy (they used the probability of a firm issuing an accounting 
restatement) is a basilar part of the analysis; they assert that previous research selected the incorrect proxies 
and, as a consequence, obtained different results. 
In conclusion, one might argue that the Big Four firms in general offer superior quality of reporting. There 
is a body of literature that investigates the reasons for this phenomenon. The Big Four are perceived as 
delivering more quality based on their competence and independence: the competence argument is associated 
with their heavy spending on retention of talent; the independence relates to their large portfolio of clients, 
which is presumed to give them bargaining power to stand up to, or walk away from, a client if necessary. 
In addition some researchers have suggested that the Big Four tend to deliver superior quality services as 
they have “more to lose” (DeAngelo, 1981). Two related arguments support this: one, the reputation 
hypothesis, suggests that among the Big Four excellence is key in retaining current clients, in attracting new 
clients, and in retaining and/or recruiting competent individuals; while there is also the deep-pockets 
hypothesis tested by Dye (1993), arguing that large firms of auditors offer superior quality because they have 
immense wealth exposed to risk in case of a lawsuit. 
4 Methodology, Method, and Data 
To collect information regarding the market’s understanding of auditing, two different market participants 
were interviewed: auditees (this group comprises both companies being currently audited and potential 
auditees) and banks. 
Regards the auditees, there were eight interviewees across different industries: wine, restaurant, 
electronics, publicity, automotive, construction, public security, and education. Seven of these are private 
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companies and one is state-owned. Of the eight enterprises, three are large companies, four are medium, and 
one is small. The selected companies are distinct precisely to capture the different dynamics and behaviours. 
The participants were either CFOs (financial directors) or executive directors. 
Among the banks were six interviewees, which represents virtually all retail banks in Portugal. 
Furthermore, participants were always C-level members with functions related to risk management or credit 
rating, given the questions being addressed. 
The intention of the interviews was to gather explicit perceptions from the market, to then compare these 
with the findings of existing empirical studies, the statistical results of which infer a certain hypothesized 
consequence. Hence, a script was created to guarantee that both banks and companies addressed the same 
basic research questions, thus allowing a pattern to emerge of both the tendencies and the results. 
• RQ1: What does auditing mean to you? In your opinion, what is the final purpose of a financial audit? 
• RQ2: For some entities, auditing is mandatory. Does this make sense to you, given the benefits and the 
costs associated with hiring auditors? 
• RQ3: Do you distinguish between the services of the Big Four accountants/auditors and non-Big Four? 
Do you believe that the Big Four firms provide superior quality? 
As for RQ4 and RQ5, they assumed different forms according to the group of participants. 
• RQ4 (Companies): Has your bank ever asked you for an audit report to lend, or renew your credit? For 
some banks, this influences the internal rating and consequently the pricing, did you know that? Have 
you ever noticed that? 
• RQ5 (companies): Does your institution have a business plan? Has your bank ever required you that in 
order to lend you money? Or do they only ask for historical information? 
• RQ4 (banks): Do you find audited financial statements relevant when analysing a client’s credit rating? 
Does an audit, particularly with unqualified (vs qualified) opinion affect the credit rating? Is the rating 
reflected further in different pricing and conditions of lending? 
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RQ5 (banks): Is it important for the bank that clients have a business plan? Do you require a business 
plan in order to lend the client money?  
It is noteworthy that semi-structured interviews provide the opportunity to excavate deeper into certain 
questions; that is, the research questions guide the interview, but provide the opportunity to further explore 
certain themes as well. 
The interviews were conducted individually, to give the participant room to share his/her opinions, and in 
Portuguese (the interviewees’ native language) to allow more fluency of language, discussion, and 
presentation of ideas. The duration of the interviews ranged between approximately fifteen and thirty minutes. 
Before each interview, the purpose of the study was presented and the participants were told that the 
interview would be recorded (and destroyed at the end), and that participation was anonymous and 
confidential (thus names and institutions would never be mentioned).  
5 Results 
This section provides a synopsis of the interviews. Semi-structured interviews constitute part of a set of 
qualitative methods and, as such, numeric statistics have only slight applicability.  
It presents the more conceptual questions about external audits (meaning, purpose, and importance) first, 
followed by questions that address specific aspects of the Big Four accounting firms vs the non-Big Four. The 
subsequent question seeks to understand to what extent external audits (with unqualified opinions) reduce the 
cost of debt for companies. To conclude, the final research question tries to capture the relevance and 
pertinence of future research in relation to the importance of a business plan (the same way this project 
addressees auditing). The business plan seems particularly pertinent, since survival without a strong business 
plan and a clear prospective vision would seems virtually impossible in a highly competitive global market. 
In response to RQ1, all eight auditee participants agreed that the purpose of auditing is to heighten the 
confidence of financial statements’ users, in fact, three interviewees mentioned the words external image, 
credibility, or security, which, constitute part of the final goal of an audit. However, only one participant 
mentioned that auditors verify whether the company is complying with the legally applicable framework. 
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Further, two participants referred to the fact that auditors also help companies make more appropriate 
decisions, as they issue a list of additional observations. This is aligned with the argument previously 
presented, that auditees benefit from the points of improvement proposed by an auditor. In conclusion, the 
majority understood the goal of the audit, yet, only four of them engage in audits voluntarily or for both 
reasons (i.e. company choice as well as a legal requirement). Interestingly, the small company did not have 
an audit and the medium companies typically engaged solely because it is mandatory, which means that for 
smaller companies the benefits of an audit might not compensate the cost. As predicted by Abdel-Khalik 
(1993), the voluntary demand for external auditing increases with firm size. Similarly, all the interviewees of 
the banks group agreed that the purpose of auditing is to augment the confidence of the users of the financial 
statements. In particular, four interviewees used the words transparency, security, and credibility; and two 
talked about standardization of applicable norms and comparability. 
In response to RQ2, all respondents find the applicable legal requirements fair and acceptable. 
Nonetheless, three company interviewees mentioned that it seems not to work in some cases, namely Enron 
or, in Portugal, the more recent scandals involving banks. One participant stated, “… in practice, with all the 
problems that arose from the financial crisis, the audit as a control mechanism has been shown not always to 
work effectively.” 
The responses to RQ3 are mixed. On the one hand, a few company interviewees agree that the Big Four 
offer superior quality; others advocate the smaller audit firms are actually able to deliver a more flexible, 
customized, continuous and timely service and refer to the cost advantage of hiring this service. On the other 
hand, banker interviewees generally believe that the Big Four offer superior audit quality, which agrees with 
the findings of Teoh and Wong (1993) that investors have more confidence in the financial results of an 
enterprise audited by one of the Big Four. In addition, this same group refers to the higher exigence imposed 
by the Big Four firms (Francis and Krishnan, 1999; Eshleman and Guo, 2014), which, as empirically 
predicted, is related to the Big Four having “more to lose” (DeAngelo, 1981). Further, some of this same 
group suggest that the Big Four have superior experience, implying greater efficiency and knowledge about 
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diverse markets. Lastly this group refer to the lack of independence of some smaller auditing companies, as 
previously discussed. One banker even suggests that “[for smaller auditing firms] each client represents a 
relevant weight on the company revenues, which may make the firm less independent, which ultimately 
induces less confidence.” Another of the bankers, however, states that “For SMEs, investing in a Big Four 
audit might not be compensatory and, on the top of that, audit practices should be clear and uniform.” 
In response to RQ4, all companies were requested by the lender to present an audit report when borrowing 
money; except for the state-owned company, which is not authorized to borrow money from commercial 
banks, and the small company that does not hire an external audit. With regard to the impact on the internal 
rating and on the interest rate, of the six companies that do carry out audits, the majority agree that having an 
unqualified opinion is advantageous. They suggest that banks’ increased confidence in company’s accounts, 
due to the audit report, induces more favourable conditions. One participant illustrates this, saying: “When, 
twenty years ago, this company started having external audits, we felt a decrease in our interest rate of almost 
1 per cent.” This view is not shared among all participants; a number do not notice any impact on the interest 
rate and one argues that, unavoidably, banks have two dissimilar interests which do not allow a direct relation 
between credit rating and interest rate: on one hand there is the commercial area that generates business, on 
the other, the area sensitive to risk, which mitigates client risk through higher interest rates. 
The response of the banks regards whether financial statements are relevant when analysing a client’s 
credit rating produces results that are even more interesting. There is general consensus that having an 
unqualified opinion (vs having no auditor opinion) has a positive effect on the internal rating, while one 
participant mentions that although it is indeed relevant, the model of the bank does not yet incorporate this. 
For the others, it seems, in fact, that the quality of the financial statements impacts on credit rating, but this 
impact varies according to the size of the company. One banking expert states at length, “For smaller 
companies we do not pay that much of attention to the quality of the financial statements, but instead to the 
behaviour of the client (e.g. usual cash flows and historical performance). However, with the larger 
companies, less consideration is given to behavioural aspects and more to the financial and, this way, the audit 
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report gains more applicability”. This is consistent with small companies not being asked for an audit report. 
It is also noteworthy that all IRB banks have models that include the quality of the audit in the final rating. 
The bankers agree that having audited accounts translates into better conditions of lending, specifically to 
a more favourable interest rate. This is consistent with the empirical result of Blackwell et al. (1998) that 
companies with external auditing pay lower interest rates. One director of a bank illustrated directly this 
relationship of risk–price, with the following explanation: “Credit has two different vectors that work in 
parallel and communicate. The assessment of risk (i.e. the capacity that a company has to support a certain 
level of debt) and the PAR (Pricing Adjusted to Risk), which incorporates the risk into the price. Commercials 
have, then, some latitude (between defined caps and floors) to change the reference price.” As some 
interviewees explained, banks depart from an issuer rating (not a transaction rating) and, based on a set of 
additional factors – e.g. the opinion of the auditor, type of exposure, maturity, collaterals, and guarantees – 
set the price. 
Finally, in response to RQ5 concerning whether it is important for the bank that clients have a business 
plan, there seems to be room for progress. Firstly, there are still companies that do not have a business plan 
and, consequently, do not know whether the company is capable of remaining in the market in its current way 
of operating. Half of companies interviewed did not have a business plan, and among those, only the small 
enterprise is developing one. For the companies with a business plan, they are commonly three–five years 
ahead. Banks, in turn, request the business plan only for special operations, such as projects that are marginal 
to the normal activity of the company, companies experiencing financial difficulty or restructuring, and when 
the past is not a solid reference for the future of the company. This finding is in line with the results relating 
to companies, which suggest that generally banks do not ask for their business plans. Therefore, banks loose 
an important tool to forecast whether the company will be able to repay the debt and all the supplementary 




The topic of the project was appointed by KPMG under the Direct Research Internship Programme, because, 
despite a large body of theoretical and empirical literature about external auditing, few studies have gathered 
explicit perceptions regarding financial statement audits specifically in Portugal. The semi-structured 
interviews conducted and analysed in this dissertation – eight company executives and six elite bankers – 
suggest that companies and banks have different opinions about auditing, and companies typically do not 
recognize the potential benefits of auditing – the increased ability to raise capital, the more favourable loan 
conditions, and the benefits of stronger internal controls – and, as such, only hire the service because it is 
mandatory. This is consistent with the perception of the business world-related issue I encountered while 
working as an auditor at KPMG, which ended up instigating this study – companies have a poor understanding 
of external auditing. 
Regards the broad activity of auditing, all respondents agree that the ultimate purpose of the audit process 
is to enhance users’ confidence in the financial statements of companies; however, few people correctly 
explained what auditors do in reality. Moreover, generally, companies engage in audit services when it is 
mandatory; that is, they are not confident that the benefit of an audit will surpass the cost. Interestingly 
enough, consistent with Abdel-Khalik (1993), the larger the company the greater the (voluntary) demand for 
this service. All participants find the Law regarding mandatory audits acceptable, although some refer to the 
recent reputational scandals of auditing companies associated with the financial crisis. Although the literature 
suggests that the Big Four accounting firms offer a superior auditing service (e.g. Eshleman and Guo, 2014), 
the results suggest that most of the companies interviewed disagree, and find smaller auditing companies 
more suitable for reasons including flexibility, timely service, and cost benefit. Banks, on the contrary, 
advocate the superior quality of the Big Four. Concerning the conditions of lending, particularly with regard 
to price, there is a gap of perception between companies and banks. Some enterprises believe that banks offer 
more favourable conditions because of their unqualified audit report (without material misstatements), while 
others do not believe it has any impact, arguing that banks have an inherent misalignment of interests (risk vs 
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commercial) that does not allow lower risk to directly reflect lower interest rate. All banks, in turn, argue that 
unqualified opinions induce lower risk and, consequently, lower interest rate, as predicted by Blackwell et al. 
(1998). 
7 Impact on the Business World 
In general these results imply sparse knowledge of external audits among the Portuguese business community, 
which might induce companies to underestimate its utility and make incorrect use of the service. To address 
this in the business world, I propose including auditing subjects – e.g. definition, demand, and benefits – in 
auditing courses, both academic and practical, in universities and in auditing firms, in Portugal. If no such 
course modules on auditing are available at present, I propose that business and accounting universities should 
implement them, not only for future auditors, but also for future managers and accountants.  
8 Limitations and Suggested Future Research 
The findings discussed should be considered in light of their limitations. Although the companies interviewed 
represent a relevant diversity of size and industries, it is still a small sample and the participants are volunteers. 
The same applies for the group of banks, the sample covers the majority of the banks in Portugal, but, again, 
the sample is small and not random. Therefore, the results drawn above should be viewed as introductory and 
as a starting point for future research. First, it would enrich the research to extend the analysis presented here 
to other market participants, such as shareholders, governments, and regulators. It would also be pertinent to 
perform similar analysis with focus on business plans, which, as earlier stated, is still underdeveloped in 
Portugal. Second, quantitative research on issues raised in the results could reveal what appears to be a pattern 
between the size of the company and the demand for auditing services, but very few quantitative analyses 
have been performed in this field in Portugal. Additionally, some companies argue that smaller accounting 
firms would better suit their requirements, and hence a study of the relation between the accounting firm 
dimension and the auditee size may be relevant. Lastly, further research might be directed to clearly 
understand whether, in Portugal, banks do in fact infer more favourable conditions for clients with an external 
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Appendix I – Companies’ Results 
 
RQ1: Does the 
participant suggest 
that the final 
purpose of 
auditing is to 
enhance the 
confidence of the 
users of FS? 
RQ2: Does the 
interviewee find 
the legal 
imposition of audit 
acceptable? 
RQ3: Does the 
participant believe 




RQ4: Does the 
interviewee say 
that banks require 
the company’s 
audit report to lend 
money? 
RQ4: Does the 
participant believe 






RQ5: Does the 
participant’s 
company have a 
business plan? 
RQ5: Does the 
interviewee say 
that banks require 
the company’s 
business plan to 
lend money? 
 Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
# 8 0 8 0 3 5 6 2 4 4 4 4 2 6 
% 100% 0% 100% 0% 38% 63% 75% 25% 50% 50% 50% 50% 25% 75% 
 
Appendix II – Banks’ Results 
 
 
RQ1: Does the 
participant suggest 
that the final 
purpose of 
auditing is to 
enhance the 
confidence of the 
users of FS? 
RQ2: Does the 
interviewee find 
the legal 
imposition of audit 
acceptable? 
RQ3: Does the 
participant believe 




RQ4: Does the 
participant’s bank 
take into account 
auditor’s opinion 
when attributing a 
credit rating to a 
company? 
RQ4: Does the 
participant’s bank 
reflect unqualified 
opinions into more 
favourable lending 
decisions? 











business plan to 
lend money? 
Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
# 6 0 6 0 4 2 5 1 6 0 6 0 4 2 
% 100% 0% 100% 0% 67% 33% 83% 17% 100% 0% 100% 0% 67% 33% 
